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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
William Selko ("Selko"), who is the assignee of his former 
attorney's professional liability policy, appeals from the 
district court's grant of summary judgment denying 
recovery on this policy against Home Insurance Company 
("Home"). 
 
I. 
 
In 1982, at age 18, Selko was the passenger in a car that 
struck a telephone pole. The accident rendered him a 
quadriplegic. He and his father engaged Stephen R. 
Signore, Jr., a Pennsylvania attorney, who has since been 
disbarred, to represent him in obtaining compensation for 
his injuries. Signore prepared and Selko executed a power 
of attorney authorizing Signore to collect all sums due to 
Selko arising from the accident and to deposit them in 
banks and other depositories. Also included was an 
investment clause, giving Signore the authority 
 
       [t]o invest in my name, in any stock, shares, bonds, 
       securities or other property, real or personal, and to 
       vary such investments as he may, in his absolute 
       discretion deem best, and to vote at meetings of any 
       corporation or company and to execute any proxies or 
       other instruments in connection therewith. 
 
Signore stated in a deposition that he prepared the power 
of attorney in light of his discussion with Selko's father, 
during which Signore stated "that there were going to be a 
lot of no-fault checks and people that had to be paid and 
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checks were going to have to be signed and whatever . . . . 
[The father replied] you know, well, why don't you take care 
of all that?" 
 
Between 1982 and 1991, Signore collected various sums 
on Selko's behalf from settlements and insurance claims. 
From these recoveries, Signore invested $300,000 without 
Selko's prior knowledge or further approval in real estate 
ventures of his own. Signore placed the collected sums in 
the bank account of a shell company wholly owned by him 
called Innovative Concepts, Inc. ("ICI"). He then caused ICI 
to issue "participation bonds" in Selko's name for the stated 
amounts as evidence of "loans" by Selko to ICI. The bonds, 
at least those of record, called for repayment of the original 
sum, together with accrued interest at ten percent per 
annum, after five years. (These bonds were due, 
respectively, in 1994, 1995, and 1996.) The monies for 
which the bonds were issued, consisting of Selko's 
$300,000 as well as sums from other purported lenders, 
were then used to purchase interests in Signore's sole 
name in real estate ventures. Selko's ICI participation 
bonds were "secured" by Signore's personal pledges of his 
real estate interests and by Signore's personal guarantees. 
ICI and Signore later defaulted on the bonds when they 
became due, beginning in 1994, and in 1995 Signorefiled 
for bankruptcy. 
 
According to Selko, he did not learn that his personal 
injury proceeds were being utilized in this manner until he 
made inquiry of Signore in 1991. After Signore responded 
with some information, Selko wrote Signore on May 9, 
1991, expressing concern about the investments' 
"illiquidity." Selko's letter also stated that he believed he 
should "diversify and reduce my 100 percent exposure to 
the vagaries of the local real estate market." Without 
replying right away, Signore continued to invest in the 
fashion described above. After further inquiries, Signore 
again responded to Selko on October 30, 1991. Reassuring 
him about the investments, Signore said that, for the "long 
term," they were sustaining a very fair return. Further 
correspondence between Selko and Signore led to Signore's 
assurances to work with Selko and "get for you some 
liquidity as soon as possible." (A building sale or 
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replacement of Selko by another investor were mentioned 
as possible ways to do this if the market improved.) 
 
Selko later sought and received guidance from a retired 
attorney, Guy Gabrielson, who met with Signore in July of 
1992. Gabrielson reported to Signore his understanding of 
that meeting in a letter dated July 17, 1992. In the letter, 
Gabrielson indicated the time was ripe to relieve Signore's 
office of further responsibilities. Gabrielson also said he 
believed Selko would like to divest himself as rapidly as 
possible of the real estate investments so that he could 
begin to diversify his investments under the guidance of an 
investment advisor, and that Gabrielson would advise Selko 
to do so. Signore testified in his deposition that he 
understood at about this time that he was being relieved of 
his representation of Selko. 
 
Gabrielson's letter was quickly followed by a letter from 
Selko to Signore dated July 20, 1992, requesting that Selko 
receive "any part, or preferably all, of my interest payments 
currently" from the ICI participation bonds, and stating 
that he wished to divest himself of all bonds as rapidly as 
possible beginning with the last to mature. Signore was 
asked to make checks either for interest or principal 
payable to Selko's order and send them to him, so that he 
could begin the process of diversifying his portfolio into 
investments other than real estate. 
 
On July 20, 1992, Selko also revoked Signore's 1982 
power of attorney, substituting in its place a far more 
limited power of attorney. The new power contained no 
investment authority but merely authorized Signore to 
claim, demand and receive "any interest or principal 
payments which may be due or payable to me in 
investments heretofore made" under the old power of 
attorney and, after deduction of sums needed to prosecute 
the automobile accident claim, to remit the same to Selko. 
Any further funds received on Selko's behalf were to be 
deposited in a bank or other depository institution. 
 
Signore neither acknowledged nor took any action to 
comply with the Selko's requests of July 20, 1992. He 
did not remit any interest nor did he take steps to 
liquidate Selko's investments as requested. No further 
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communication occurred between Signore and Selko until 
more than two years later, in September of 1994. In that 
month, the earlier of Selko's ICI participation bonds became 
due. A new attorney representing Selko made demands 
upon Signore for payment. When no payment was 
forthcoming, Selko commenced a legal action in the state 
court against Signore, seeking damages for legal 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. This action was 
settled on July 31, 1995. The settlement agreement 
provided for entry of judgment against Signore for 
$443,585.50. As part of the agreement, Signore assigned to 
Selko all his rights against Home under a policy of 
professional liability insurance he had purchased for his 
law firm in April of 1994. 
 
On October 12, 1994, a few days after Selko sued him, 
Signore promptly notified Home of Selko's malpractice 
action against him. Home refused to defend or indemnify 
Signore under the policy, asserting, among other defenses, 
that, when applying for the policy, Signore had known of 
but had not disclosed the existence of Selko's potential 
claim for breach of professional duty. Under the terms of 
the policy, Home agreed to pay damages on behalf of the 
insured for an act, error, or omission happening prior to 
the effective date of the policy only if before such date "the 
Insured had no basis to believe that the Insured had 
breached a professional duty . . . ."1  In declining liability, 
Home relied on this clause, and also on Signore's negative 
answer to a question in the policy application asking, 
 
       "11.d. does any lawyer named in (question) 5(a) know 
       of any circumstances, acts, errors or omissions that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Signore's professional liability policy ran from April 20, 1994 through 
April 20, 1995. Its Coverage section provided that to be covered, an act, 
error, or omission had to occur 
 
       "(aa) during the policy period or 
       (bb) prior to the policy period provided that prior to the 
effective date 
       of this policy 
 
* * * 
 
the insured had no basis to believe that the insured had breached a 
professional duty . . . ." 
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       could [emphasis added] result in a professional liability 
       claim against any attorney of the firm, or its 
       predecessor. 
 
Home continued to deny coverage under the policy when 
Selko, pursuant to the settlement with Signore and the 
assignment of the policy, later sought indemnification for 
the losses he had sustained because of Signore's 
wrongdoing.2 Selko then brought the present diversity 
action in the district court against Home. After discovery, 
both Selko and Home moved for summary judgment, and 
the court allowed Home's motion but denied Selko's. This 
appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
In granting summary judgment to Home, the district 
court construed Signore's deposition testimony as admitting 
that, when applying for the policy, Signore already knew he 
had breached his professional duty to Selko. For this 
reason, the policy's basis to believe exclusion was held to 
bar recovery. The district court noted that Rule 1.8(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct provided, in 
essence, that a lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or acquire an ownership interest 
adverse to a client without full written disclosure of the 
transaction and terms. Additionally, the client is to be 
advised and given a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advice of independent counsel. 
 
The court determined that Signore's investment of Selko's 
funds in his personal real estate ventures clearly violated 
Rule 1.8(a). Signore did not advise Selko for two years 
where his money was invested and of Signore's personal 
financial involvement. Signore, moreover, did not honor his 
client's wishes, expressed in May 1991, to diversify, but 
instead increased the investment. The court found the 
investment authorization in the 1982 power of attorney fell 
short of being adequate written disclosure under Rule 
1.8(a). The court concluded that when Signore applied for 
malpractice insurance in April of 1994, "he clearly had a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Signore filed for bankruptcy in 1995 and was disbarred by consent. 
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basis to believe that a claim of malpractice could be 
brought against him." 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied 
particularly upon a Wisconsin case, Logan v. Northwestern 
Nat'l Cas. Co., 424 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1988). As the district 
court explained, the Logan court "held that determining 
whether an insured had a `basis to believe' must be tested 
by whether the insured knew or believed that he had 
committed a breach of his professional duty.' " Selko v. 
Home Ins. Co., No. 95-7653, 1996 WL 397483, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. July 10, 1996) (citing Logan, 424 N.W.2d at 186). The 
district court went on to say, 
 
       "In adopting this standard, the Logan court rejected an 
       objective standard, i.e. `knew or should have known,' 
       because it potentially gives insurers a windfall to deny 
       coverage in many cases and ultimately defeats the 
       purpose of the contract." 
 
Id. The district court determined, on the basis of Signore's 
deposition testimony, that there was no genuine issue of 
fact over whether Signore had a basis to believe he had 
breached his professional duty owed to Signore. 
 
III. 
 
On appeal, Selko accepts the Logan standard adopted by 
the district court, which tests whether an insurance 
applicant had a "basis to believe" he had breached a 
professional duty by whether he knew or believed he had 
done so. However, Selko argues that "[n]otwithstanding the 
district court's avowed acceptance of this standard, it 
wholly failed to apply it in practice." 
 
According to Selko, Home failed to meet its affirmative 
burden of proving that Signore had a "basis to believe" that 
he had breached a professional duty. Viewing the evidence 
most favorably to himself, Selko contends that, at very 
least, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Signore 
knew or believed he had committed a breach of any 
professional duty when he applied for the policy. 
 
Selko insists, moreover, that the court erred infinding 
that Signore made additional investments of Selko's money 
 
                                7 
  
after receiving Selko's letter dated May 9, 1991. Selko 
points to portions of Signore's deposition indicating that 
Selko's monies were invested in real estate as early as the 
mid-1980's and that later participation bonds were 
replacements of former ones that cannot be found. By the 
time Selko complained of "illiquidity" in 1991, it was 
supposedly beyond Signore's power to do more than 
continue the earlier investments. 
 
Selko further complains that Signore never conceded in 
his deposition that he had actual knowledge of 
Pennsylvania's Professional Rule of Responsibility 1.8. 
According to Selko, Signore believed that the power of 
attorney, with its broad investment provision, empowered 
him to make the real estate investments in question. Selko 
concludes that the evidence is, at best, conflicting whether 
Signore ever subjectively knew he had violated any ethical 
duty to Selko. 
 
By the same token, Selko denies that Signore knew of 
any potential malpractice claim against him. He argues that 
by granting him another, albeit more limited, power of 
attorney in 1992, Selko showed that he harbored no 
thoughts of a claim against him. Selko also cites to a case 
from the Eastern District of Missouri indicating that 
evidence "clearly reflect[ing] dissatisfaction" is a necessary 
prelude to invocation of the "basis to believe" exclusion. 
General Accident Ins. Co. v. Trefys, 657 F. Supp. 164, 167 
(E.D. Mo. 1987). Selko further argues that, if Signore had 
any inkling of a pending claim, he would not -- as he did 
-- have switched malpractice carriers in April of 1994. In 
the years previous, Signore had continuously obtained 
malpractice insurance from another company, Selko says. 
Presumably, the "basis to believe" exclusion (or comparable 
proviso) would not have been a defense available to his 
earlier carrier, since the clause would only bar claims 
based on conduct prior to the issuance of a policy. 
 
IV. 
 
Perhaps the crucial issue in this appeal is the proper 
construction of the clause in the Home policy "that prior to 
the effective date of this policy . . . (2) the Insured had no 
 
                                8 
  
basis to believe that the Insured had breached a 
professional duty . . . ." We turn to that first. Because 
Pennsylvania law governs, we ask how the Pennsylvania 
courts would read that clause; but as there is no applicable 
Pennsylvania precedent we must construe the clause 
without direct guidance, looking at its language, the 
decisions from other courts to the extent helpful, and 
Pennsylvania's rules of construction. 
 
As noted, Selko points to language in Logan, supra, 
suggesting the "basis to believe" provision should be read 
subjectively. So read, Selko contends, the record fails to 
support Home's burden of proving beyond genuine dispute 
that Signore actually knew or believed when he applied for 
professional responsibility coverage in April of 1994 that he 
had breached a professional duty. 
 
Home disagrees that Signore's subjective belief is key. It 
argues that Logan does not dictate an exclusively subjective 
interpretation, and that, in any case, a correct 
understanding of the "basis to believe" clause is to be found 
in recent federal district court decisions from the Western 
and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania. These decisions 
held, in essence, that the "basis to believe" clause requires 
a determination of whether the insured was subjectively 
aware of facts that would have led a reasonable attorney to 
believe that he had breached a professional duty. We agree 
with this "mixed" formulation and hold that, however Logan 
is understood, the district court cases have correctly 
tracked the meaning of the language. 
 
The first of these decisions was Home Ins. Co. v. 
Stegenga, No. 90-275 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 1991), aff'd (3d Cir. 
Feb. 3, 1992). There an attorney neglected to bring a 
lawsuit before the statute of limitations had expired, having 
misled his client into thinking that he was diligently 
pursuing the matter. The district court said, inter alia, 
 
       Stegenga argues that he did not know, subjectively, 
       that his actions might give rise to liability. The 
       insurance contract, he argues, disallows coverage only 
       if he was actually aware of the legal consequences of 
       his actions. Such an interpretation is manifestly 
       inconsistent with the plain language of the policy. 
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        True, the condition, set forth in the policy-- that the 
       Insured "have no basis to believe" -- disallows coverage 
       where the insured is subjectively aware of certain facts. 
       There is no language, however, indicating that the 
       insured must have been subjectively aware that these 
       facts might give rise to liability. As long as the insured 
       is subjectively aware of facts that, under an objective 
       "reasonable person" standard would be seen as 
       possibly giving rise to liability, he will not be covered 
       for liability resulting from those incidents [citing 
       Logan]. 
 
       * * * 
 
       This, of course, makes perfect sense because 
       otherwise, one would only need to [ ] make certain he 
       was ignorant of his duties in order to be insured for 
       violating them. No-one, not the insurer and not the 
       insured, knows ahead of time what facts will give rise 
       to liability. In order to properly allocate the risk, the 
       policy sensibly puts the burden on the insured to 
       disclose those facts known only to him, so that the 
       costs of the risk can be evaluated with all the relevant 
       information accessible to all parties. 
 
Id. at 4-6 (emphasis in original). The analysis in Stegenga 
was endorsed in Home Ins. Co. v. Thorp, No. 95-951 (W.D. 
Pa. July 17, 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993), and 
in Home Ins. Co. v. Powell, No. 95-6305, 1996 WL 269496 
(E.D. Pa. May 20, 1996). Most recently, Judge Cohill of the 
Western District of Pennsylvania wrote comprehensively to 
the same effect, specifically rejecting the district court's 
view in this case that a purely subjective measure applies. 
Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 954 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997). 
 
The above cases, decided in federal courts in 
Pennsylvania by judges familiar with that state's law, are of 
course neither binding on the Pennsylvania courts nor 
upon ourselves. We find their reading of the disputed policy 
language, however, to be persuasive and to comport with 
our understanding of its plain meaning. See Bateman v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 527 Pa. 241 (1991) (language of 
contract is primary consideration in interpreting an 
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insurance contract); O'Brien Energy Sys. v. American 
Employers' Ins. Co., 427 Pa. Super. 456, 491 (1993), appeal 
denied, 537 Pa. 633 (1994) (policy language should be 
construed in accordance with plain and ordinary meaning). 
 
Selko would construe the language "provided . . . the 
insured had no basis to believe that the insured had 
breached a professional duty" as if it were written, 
"provided . . . the insured neither knew nor believed that 
the insured had breached a professional duty." There is, 
however, a significant difference in meaning between these 
two formulations. The latter wording, had it been 
incorporated into the policy, would, indeed, have indicated 
that the insured's own knowledge and belief were the 
touchstones. But the actual policy language is different. Its 
phraseology -- that "the insured had [no basis to believe]" 
-- refers, it is true, to the factual predicate possessed by 
the insured. But it measures that predicate by the 
impersonal standard of a "basis to believe," not by what the 
insured knew or believed. Had the provision been meant to 
stand or fall on the individual insured's subjective 
assessment of the known facts, it could easily have used 
the words "knew" or "believed," as indicated above. Instead, 
by using the words "basis to believe," the policy pointed to 
an objective criterion. 
 
Hence, we agree with Stegenga that the plain language of 
the exclusion calls for a two-stage analysis. First, it must 
be shown that the insured knew of certain facts. Second, in 
order to determine whether the knowledge actually 
possessed by the insured was sufficient to create a "basis 
to believe," it must be determined that a reasonable lawyer 
in possession of such facts would have had a basis to 
believe that the insured had breached a professional duty.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We recognize that, in Pennsylvania as well as elsewhere, exclusions 
are strictly construed against the insurer, as are ambiguities in the 
policy. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 
A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983); First Pa. Bank v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 580 
A.2d 799, 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). Clear policy language, however, is 
to be given effect, Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 566; and 
courts should not "torture the language to create" ambiguities but 
should read policy provisions to avoid it, Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Pepicelli, 
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That the insured denies recognizing such a basis on 
grounds of ignorance of the law, oversight, psychological 
difficulties, or other personal reasons is immaterial. 
 
This construction does not relieve the insurer of its 
burden to prove that the necessary underlying facts were 
actually known to the insured. But the insured may not 
successfully defend on the ground that he was uniquely 
unaware of ethical and fiduciary principles that all lawyers 
would know or that he did not understand the implications 
of conduct and events that any reasonable lawyer would 
have grasped. 
 
Selko argues that to interpret the provision in this 
manner is unfair to a victimized client such as himself who 
has no other redress but his defalcating attorney's 
professional liability insurance. However, the exclusionary 
clause in question addresses only misconduct during the 
period prior to the effective date of the policy. It is 
reasonable for the insurer to refuse coverage for claims 
based on preexisting but undisclosed misconduct by an 
insured attorney. Nor is it unreasonable to tie such an 
exclusion to an even-handed "reasonable attorney" 
assessment, rather than to speculation concerning the 
individual attorney's subjective understanding. The latter 
approach, by rewarding the attorney who is ignorant of the 
law, or by encouraging disingenuous, after-the-fact 
justifications, could result in totally capricious and 
unpredictable outcomes. Under the mixed standard we 
believe the Pennsylvania court would adopt, coverage does 
not turn on psychoanalysis, yet the attorney is not made 
accountable for matters he did not know about, nor for 
known matters that would not cause a reasonable attorney 
to foresee a claim. 
 
A case such as this is painful, in that it may leave a 
malpractice victim without an effective remedy. But courts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pepicelli, Watts and Youngs, P.C., 821 F.2d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 
655 
F.2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1981)). The mixed standard we adopt is not 
merely one of several possible interpretations but is, in our view, the 
interpretation plainly signaled by the contract language. 
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cannot conscientiously rewrite an insurance contract 
between a defalcating attorney and his insurer in order to 
furnish coverage for the wronged assignee. Where states 
have decided, on policy grounds, to guarantee insurance 
coverage, e.g. for motor vehicle injuries, they have done so 
by comprehensive legislation requiring specific kinds of 
insurance as a condition to licensure and by regulating 
policy language. No such legislation applies here. 
 
V. 
 
Applying the above interpretation of the Home policy, we 
hold that the only reasonable interpretation of this record 
is that a reasonable attorney in Signore's shoes would have 
realized in April 1994, when Signore applied for the 
insurance, that he had a basis to believe that he had 
breached a professional duty to Selko. Selko, we note, 
concedes in his appellate brief that Signore breached his 
common law fiduciary and professional duties under the 
1982 power of attorney and the lawyer-client relationships 
by making unsuitable real estate investments and by failing 
to give Selko the necessary information to make any 
informed decision in the matter. The facts underlying the 
breach were all fully known to Signore when he applied to 
Home for professional responsibility insurance. The facts 
known to Signore would, additionally, have caused a 
reasonable attorney to answer "yes" rather than "no" to the 
question in the insurance application asking if the 
applicant knew "of any circumstances, acts, errors, or 
omissions that could result in a professional liability claim 
against any attorney of the firm." [Emphasis supplied.] 
 
We disagree with appellant's suggestions that Signore's 
misconduct was merely marginal. To the contrary, it was 
egregious. Without meaningful explanation to and approval 
from his injured, youthful client, he loaned his client's 
monies to himself (ICI being wholly owned by him), using 
the funds to buy for himself partnership positions in 
various real estate ventures. These unauthorized loans were 
evidenced by five year bonds bearing ten percent interest 
that was not, however, payable until the bonds' maturity. 
As events were to prove, the bonds were risky in the 
extreme; they were unsecured by mortgages or meaningful 
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collateral. As Signore conceded, he did not disclose these 
transactions in writing to his client prior to receiving 
inquiry from Selko in 1991 nor does it appear that he made 
any adequate disclosure of any type. By this time, because 
of a falling market, Signore would not or could not disinvest 
although Selko asked him to do so. In his verified 
complaint against Signore, Selko properly described the 
investments, inter alia, as insecure and unsuitable for one 
in Selko's quadriplegic condition. 
 
In utilizing Selko's funds in this way, Signore clearly 
subordinated his client's interests to his own greed. Had 
Signore's real estate ventures succeeded, Signore would 
have profited while Selko would, at best, have recovered his 
money after five years with accrued interest at ten percent 
per annum -- a rate little higher than conventional, safe 
investments would have paid on an annual basis. In a 
nutshell, without consultation and informed approval, 
Signore used his client's money to finance his own losing 
gamble in the real estate market. 
 
Signore's contention that he was authorized to do this by 
the broad general investment clause in the power of 
attorney is obviously without merit. The chief purpose of 
the power, as Signore's own deposition attested, was to 
enable Signore to collect and administer Selko's multi- 
sourced recoveries. The investment clause cannot be read 
to authorize Signore to gamble with his client's money or 
utilize the money in ways that put his own interests ahead 
of Selko's. The district court, moreover, correctly took 
account of Signore's violation of Rule 1.8(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional conduct disallowing 
business transactions between lawyer and client without 
full written disclosure. See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 67 
(Pa. 1989). 
 
It is true that, in Signore's deposition testimony, he said 
he had discussed the real estate investments in the 1980's 
with Selko or Selko's father, and they appeared satisfied. 
Signore conceded, however, that these discussions were 
after the fact of the investments. Moreover, his recollection 
of what was said, and when, was so conclusory, blurred, 
and inconsistent as to render the testimony virtually 
meaningless. In his own deposition, Selko flatly denied that 
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Signore ever told him of the real estate investments prior to 
1991, and even Signore admitted that he never provided 
written information until after the monies were locked into 
the "participation bonds" and so beyond withdrawal. 
 
There is nothing, moreover, to the argument that Signore 
could not be expected to have known of Selko's 
dissatisfaction. When seeking insurance in April of 1994, 
Signore was well aware of facts that would have strongly 
indicated to a reasonable attorney that Selko was unhappy 
-- and would soon be even more unhappy. Selko had 
consulted another lawyer in 1992, had criticized the 
investments, had relieved Signore, had eliminated Signore's 
investment authority, and had specifically asked him to 
return his money. Almost two years had then elapsed 
without response and without return of any money. Signore 
stated in a subsequent letter that, during this period, the 
real estate market had "slowed to a crawl" and values were 
either "down or . . . stagnant." It was plainly apparent by 
April of 1994 that Selko's entire $300,000 was in imminent 
peril. Signore and ICI in fact defaulted on the bonds only 
four months later. In these circumstances, a reasonable 
attorney in Signore's shoes would have realized that he had 
a dissatisfied client who would undoubtedly take further 
legal action absent a miraculous and unlikely turnaround 
in the real estate market. 
 
Since this case arises on summary judgment, the 
ultimate question boils down to whether, viewing the record 
most favorably to plaintiff, a reasonable fact finder might 
find that, seen through the lens of what a reasonable 
lawyer would have believed, Signore was without basis to 
believe that he had breached a professional duty. 
 
To state this question is to answer it. We do not see how 
it could reasonably be found on this record, even when 
viewed most favorably to plaintiff, that a reasonable lawyer 
would have had no "basis to believe" that a breach of 
professional duty had occurred. 
 
There is no need to proceed further. We affirm the 
judgment below. See Central Penn. Teamsters Fund v. Peat 
Marwick Main S. Co., 85 F.3d 1098, 1107 (3d Cir. 1996) 
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(court of appeals may affirm on any ground supported by 
record). 
 
So ordered. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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